We present a model of electoral competition in which parties act as brands and use competition to select their candidates. We show that the forces that shape the competition between party representatives and independents rationalize the positive correlation between inequality and polarization documented by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) for the US. We also show that, when voters are badly informed about the quality of candidates, it is optimal for party to use primaries to get an edge on independent candidates. This rationalizes the introduction of the American direct primary in the US at the beginning of the twentieth century.
candidate preferences, 2) party platforms and 3) the quality of the candidates'projects to make their decision. This paper shows how party organization impacts on voter information, and thereby on party and candidate behavior. First, we show that, because of local constituencies, "party as a brand" e¤ects à la Snyder and Ting (2002) induce parties to adopt polarized positions. Moreover, the equilibrium degree of polarization typically correlates with economic inequality. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to electoral competition provides the …rst theoretical foundation supporting the empirical regularities identi…ed by McCarty et al. (2006) . Second, we focus on the candidates'incentives to engineer better platforms.
We show that local primaries typically improve the incentives of party candidates, and do not in ‡uence the independents'incentives. This result contributes to the debate about the rationale behind the inception of the American direct primary (see Ware 2002) : it shows that primaries allow parties to win districts otherwise lost to independents.
Our model is centered on two essential features: candidates are local and the internal structure of parties acts as an information revelation device about the preferences and quality of their candidates. There is a continuum of districts. Each district elects one legislator under plurality rule. There are at most three candidates per district: one for each of the two national parties, and an independent. As in Snyder and Ting (2002) , the ideologic preferences of candidates are private information. As in Castanheira and Crutzen (2007) , voters only know that they are random draws from a district-speci…c distribution of ideologic preferences. Only party a¢ liation allows for a (partial) revelation of the future policy of the candidate: the is the "party-as-a-brand"e¤ect. The median voter of each district is pivotal and elects his preferred candidate.
Our …rst result is that the "branding" function of parties implies that each party only enjoys the support of districts that are within a certain ideologic distance from its national platform. This contrasts sharply with classical Downsian models of electoral competition, in which the right-wing party typically enjoys the support of all districts to the right of the median and the left-wing party receives all the votes of the electorate to the left of the median.
The intuition builds on a simple mean-variance trade-o¤. Consider the problem faced by the median voter in a given district. Based on national platforms, he can immediately identify which party he prefers. But, should he vote for that party or for the independent?
The party label reduces the uncertainty about the future behavior of its a¢ liated candidates.
This gives party candidates an advantage over independents when the bliss point of the voter is not too distant from the party platform. But, the larger this ideologic distance, the less voters value party control. Beyond a certain distance, voters (and hence districts) prefer the independent because she depends on her local constituency only.
Our second result is that, under very mild conditions, the two parties choose to polarize their platforms. The point is that, by di¤erentiating their platforms, they can win a larger number of districts: by moving too close to the national median, they would lose extreme districts to independents. Again, this is in sharp contrast with the usual Downsian "median voter" …nding.
This …rst set of results provides a novel theoretical rationale behind the dance between polarization and inequality uncovered by McCarty et al. (2006) . Indeed, suppose the economy is initially such that inequality across districts is very limited. 3 Then, the Downsian prediction must hold: the lion's share of the votes is at the centre, pushing both parties to converge to the national median's preferred policy, in an e¤ort to capture all those votes.
What happens if inequality increases? Parties now face a trade-o¤: if they stay at the centre, they lose the districts in the tails of the ideologic distribution. If they polarize, they lose some centrist districts. We show that the cost of polarizing is a loss proportional to only half the centrist districts, because these districts are shared with the other party. Instead, the gain is proportional to all the districts in the tails (here the two parties do not compete directly with one another). Hence, it is a dominant strategy for both parties to polarize as inequality increases (up to the point where the marginal bene…t of such a move equals its marginal cost).
Next, we go back to another consequence of the presence of the American direct primary.
Given that these primaries are tournaments, we show that, in a world where the electorate is badly informed about candidates, the winner of each primary has always an additional electoral advantage over independents. This result builds on previous work by Castanheira, candidates. Here we show that when parties are able to identify good platforms and voters are not, candidate e¤ort must increase in equilibrium, which in turn gives them a valence advantage over independents. As a consequence, voters trust party candidates more than independents, who do not face the same pre-electoral tournament.
This second set of results allows us to rationalize why parties voluntarily decided to adopt the American direct primary between 1899 and 1915, even though it partly stripped parties of their freedom to select their candidates. Before that period, the US was a largely rural and face-to-face society, in which political candidates were well known to their electorate. Thus, informational problems about their preferences and their quality were largely absent. Yet, in the space of a few decades, the country moved away from this face-to-face society, as industrialization and urbanization gained pace. As a consequence, the American society became more anonymous. Voters found themselves knowing much less about political candidates. 4 In such an environment, parties realized they had to modify the system to allow their candidates to regain a competitive edge over independents. The American direct primary was the solution they adopted: by increasing the expected valence of party candidates, the direct primary allowed parties to keep or even reconquer the political ground independents had taken away from them.
The Model
Two parties, D and R, are competing in a country-wide election. Parties choose their national platform in order to maximize their seat share in Congress. One seat is associated with each district i, and we assume a continuum of districts. A district is characterized by y i , the bliss policy of the district median voter. We assume a uniform distribution of districts y i from a to a. The median voter is always decisive in his district: the winner is his most preferred candidate.
Voter preferences
The policy space is unidimensional. On the ideological dimension, the median voter in district i has single-peaked, quadratic, preferences. In addition, policy incorporates a 4 See Ware (2002) for an outstanding account of this evolution and its e¤ects on political competition.
"valence" dimension, v i :
where x i is the ideological position of the policy implemented by the winning candidate and v i is the valence of his/her policy.
Voters face uncertainty regarding the two dimensions of policy. Taking expectations, we
have:
where i is the expected policy position of the candidate, and 2 is the variance of that policy position. Similarly, i is the candidate's expected valence. We endogenize these valences in Section 4, where we will show that expected candidate valence depends on party a¢ liation.
Until then, we assume that all politicians have equal valence.
Candidate policy preferences
Three candidates are running in each district: one from party D, one from party R and one independent, I i -in what follows, party candidates are men and independents are women. Each candidate has privately known policy preferences. If the winning candidate is the independent, her agenda in Congress is entirely determined by private preferences. If the winner is a party candidate, he follows his own agenda only on a fraction of the decisions, which implies that the median voter's expected utility is a combination of the candidate's (expected) preferences and of the party platform (see 'Parties'below).
Candidate policy preferences x i are distributed according to some district-speci…c distribution g i (x i ). 5 Following the above notation, the mean of the distribution is i , which we assume equal to the preferences of the median voter: i = y i . Taking expectations, the expected utility of the median voter is therefore:
if the independent is elected. This summarizes in a tractable way the idea that candidate selection is local in the U.S., and based on local primaries. The results in Section 3 would 5 This distribution of candidate preferences may be thought to re ‡ect the distribution of preferences in the local electorate. The di¤erence with citizen candidate models is that candidate entry is not strategic as in, e.g., Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne and Slivinski (1996) . easily extend to a biased candidate selection process, such that i = y i + , or if the expected preferences of the candidates were a convex combination of local and national preferences. In Section 4, we show why the main parties bene…t from a selection process based on primaries.
Parties
The two parties choose their national party platform, x D and x R , simultaneously. Voters observe them perfectly. Yet, these national platforms will only prevail on a fraction of the decisions voted during the term since, for the reasons highlighted in the introduction, party candidates pursue their own (local) agenda on a substantial fraction of the decisions. We denote the latter fraction by . Second, while independent candidates only face one electoral hurdle, party candidates face two of them: …rst, they must win the primary election contest.
Second, contest winners must compete in the general election. Section 4 shows why this second hurdle leads to a higher expected valence for candidates a¢ liated with a party.
The distinction between candidates and parties is at the center of our analysis. Cox and The implication for voters is that, for a fraction of the decisions, their expected utility is the same as with an independent. For the remaining fraction (1 ), they know that x P is implemented. Hence, their expected utility is:
if the candidate of party P 2 fD; Rg is elected.
Platform choices
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The party chooses a policy x P . Yet, the party also leaves its candidates autonomous on some fraction of the decisions. We show that the trade-o¤ between policy uncertainty (uncertainty is higher with independent candidates) and party policy centralization (which only prevails for party candidates) shapes a set around the party national position that we call the party catchment area: districts outside this set are alienated by party a¢ liation, and strictly prefer the independent. This has non-trivial e¤ects on the party strategy: since their catchment area has …nite size, both parties prefer to polarize when districts have su¢ -ciently heterogeneous preferences. Since, as we show in Section 3.3, preference heterogeneity correlates with economic inequality, our results actually provide a sound theoretical rationale for the "dance"between inequality and polarization uncovered by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006).
Party catchment area
Here, we analyze the voting decision of the median voter in each district, and determine the set of districts that favor a party candidate; we call this set the party catchment area. It will be used to explain the equilibrium choice of party platforms in the next subsection.
Voters choose between a candidate free from party links (the independent) and a candidate whose legislative activity will (partly) be controlled by his party. Hence, a party can only win a district if it provides value added to local voters. In this sense, independent candidates act as an outside option to voters in an otherwise duopoly market; their potential entry acts as a constant threat on the parties'seat share. 7 This alters the way a party's electoral support is determined. In Downsian models, the two parties compete only with one another. The left-wing party wins all the districts to the left of its national policy platform. Likewise, the right-wing party wins all the districts to the right of its platform. This is not true in our setup, because voters have a third option.
Formally, the median voter of district i elects the candidate of party D if he dominates both the candidate of party R and the independent (a similar condition holds for party R):
This implies:
Proposition 1 When all candidates have equal valence, the catchment areas
of the two parties are the sets of districts su¢ ciently close to each national party platform. 7 For simplicity, we assume that the independent always runs, even if she has a zero probability of winning.
Adding an entry stage would not alter our conclusions: by backward induction, independents would not enter when their winning probability is zero, and would otherwise enter. Potential entry of local independents is thus su¢ cient for our analysis to be valid.
Formally:
Independent candidates win in all other districts:
Since the independent candidate is free from party ties, she may have excessive liberty in the agenda she pursues once elected. From an ex ante perspective, this freedom of action constitutes a risk for the voters. The cost associated with this risk is summarized by , the standard-error of the distribution of candidate preferences. 8 But freedom of action also has advantages: independent candidates pursue a policy that, in expected terms, better links with the preferences of the district median. In contrast, party candidates must follow their party national policy, which does not depend on local preferences. Being a party candidate is therefore a handicap in districts that are too distant from the national party line. The proposition shows that the cost of electing the party candidate is fully summarized by jy i x P j, the distance between the national party platform and the bliss policy of the district median.
In this simpli…ed setup, voters simply compare this distance with the uncertainty surrounding the preferences of a single candidate: the party candidate is preferred when > jy i x P j. Conversely, the independent is preferred when < jy i x P j. This implies that the set of districts electing party candidates is always bounded: the party catchment area can never extend beyond a distance from the national party platform. 9 This contrasts with models that overlook the micro-level process of candidate a¢ liation. In such models, there is no party alienation: all left-wing districts support the left-wing party, and conversely for right-wing districts.
Let us take a numerical example: assume that = 1, x D = 2 and x R = 2. In standard models, D should win in all districts y i < 0 and R in all districts y i > 0. Applying Proposition 1, one can check that, in our setup the catchment area of party
. That is, because D is too far away from 0; it cannot win moderate districts.
Likewise, because it is not overly extreme either, it cannot win districts y i < 3. Conversely, all the districts:
elect the candidate of party R.
XD XR Party catchment areas
Equilibrium: platform positioning
We now turn to the impact of voting behavior on party platform choices. Parties choose to polarize as long as their catchment areas intersect. 10 Conversely, they choose to move towards the center if their catchment area stretches beyond the support of district preferences
(from a to a). The result of this trade-o¤ is that parties will generally adopt polarized platforms, to an extent that is proportional to the degree of preference heterogeneity across districts.
The rationale for the result is as follows. The party catchment area being bounded, a move to the left (resp.: right) implies that the party loses some districts to its right (or: left). Let us consider party D, with a platform a < x D < a. This platform implies that the left-most district (y i = a) strictly prefers party D to the independent. Hence, the party cannot lose that district by slightly moving towards the center. Since the party wins some centrist districts, it strictly prefers a more moderate platform.
Now consider a centrist platform: a < x D < x R . In that case, the party loses in the most extreme districts: a move to the left can be pro…table. What is the cost in terms of lost centrist districts? Whenever the two party platforms are close to one another, the swing district is the one indi¤erent between the two parties:
. In this case, the size of the catchment area must increase when party D moves left: for each district won at the tail of the distribution, the party only loses 1/2 district in the centre. Hence, the party strictly prefers a more extreme platform.
Whether the party has an incentive to adopt a more moderate or a more extreme platform will thus depend on the two parties'positions and on the distance between the centre and the most extreme districts. This distance is typically related to economic inequality: the more unequal is income distribution, the more distant economically will be the richest and the poorest districts in the country. We document this in more detail in the next subsection.
Formally, the parameter of interest will thus be a, the position of the most extreme districts. To limit the number of cases to consider, we assume that the degree of preference heterogeneity across districts is su¢ ciently small: a 2 : This potentially allows the two parties to cover all districts, thereby foreclosing all independents. Larger values of a will be of interest for the next section.
Starting with symmetric positions: x D = x R > 0, Proposition 1 and the informal discussion above reveal that there are two cases to consider: when platforms are su¢ ciently polarized, that is when x D = x R > ; the two parties'catchment areas are disjoint:
Conversely, when platforms are less polarized, that is when x D = x R , the two parties are competing with each other for moderate districts. Proposition 1 shows that centreleft districts then elect a party D candidate, whereas centre-right districts elect a party R candidate:
Knowing that there is one seat associated with each district, how do these catchment areas translate into seat shares? Let F (y i ) denote the cumulated density function of the distribution of districts. Given the uniform distribution of districts, F ( ) is given by:
To illustrate the incentive for polarization, consider the case in which the two parties are su¢ ciently close ( x D = x R < ) and district heterogeneity is su¢ ciently large (a > ).
In this case, the two parties are competing in centrist districts but lose extreme districts.
The seat share of party D, denoted s D , is then:
and a similar equation holds for party R. This seat share is strictly decreasing in x D : the party has a strict incentive to polarize, because it only loses half as many centrist districts as it wins extreme districts.
Conversely, for su¢ ciently extreme platforms, i.e. for x D < a, the party's catchment area stretches beyond the most extreme district:
In this case, the party can clearly increase its seat share by adopting a more moderate platform. We thus …nd that:
Proposition 2 For any a , equilibrium platform positions are:
whereas x D = x R = 0 for a < : That is: a) the median voter theorem only holds for su¢ ciently low levels of inequality (a < ); b) for higher levels of inequality (a 2 [ ; 2 ]), interparty polarization is increasing in the level of inequality. 
which is strictly decreasing in x D . Hence, party D never selects a platform x D > a; its seat share is necessarily maximized in x D = a. By symmetry, x R = a :
Beyond some level of polarization, some centrist districts are lost without any bene…t:
all extreme districts are already electing a party candidate. Therefore, the party has an incentive to adopt a more moderate platform -this is the standard argument behind the median voter theorem. But there is another force: if platforms are already moderate, the parties' incentive to move towards the center is actually overshadowed by the desire to win extreme districts. Indeed, when they are su¢ ciently close to one another, that is when
x R x D 2 , the two parties are in a "direct competition zone". If D moves its platform to the right by ", then it only wins in "=2 additional centrist districts while it loses " districts on the tail of the distribution. Castanheira and Crutzen (2007) show that the same argument is valid in a more general set-up. As one can see, both rows (2) and (5) in Table 1 show that our proxy for inter-district preference heterogeneity increases at the same time as within-state Gini coe¢ cients do.
Application: the American dance of ideology and inequality
What is more, an increase in the average of state-level Gini coe¢ cients is associated with a more than proportional increase in interstate heterogeneity (see rows (3) and (6)).
Primaries and endogenous candidate valence
In this section, we endogenize the valence of the candidates'platforms. To simplify matters, we assume that the two parties'platform positions, x D and x R , are …xed. As in Caillaud and Tirole (2002) and in Castanheira, Crutzen and Sahuguet (2008), candidates must invest time and e¤ort to increase the valence (or "quality") of their platform. Clearly, party catchment areas must increase in size when party candidates invest more than independents.
We assume that e¤ort increases the probability that a candidate's platform has high valence. Formally, in the absence of e¤ort, valence is always 0. With e¤ort, valence can be either 0 or take a higher value. The probability that valence is high is equal to the e¤ort e supplied by the politician, at a cost c (e) = e 2 =2. We assume throughout that e¤orts are not observable: neither the party nor the voters observe the politicians'e¤ort levels. The objective of politicians is to maximize their election probability, net of e¤ort costs.
Voters do not observe either actual valences. 12 Instead, parties do: primaries reveal 1 2 This assumption is made to simplify the analysis; di¤erent information structures can be considered. For instance, Castanheira, Crutzen and Sahuguet (2008) proposes a model in which voters also get information information inside the party. The party primary can thus select the candidate with the highest valence for the general election. Primaries are thus the channel through which candidate e¤ort can be valued. Indeed, e¤ort cannot play a direct role at convincing voters, since they have inferior information. Yet, voters know that primaries give incentives to candidates. In equilibrium, expected valence will re ‡ect these incentives: we show below that the candidate from a party with internal primaries gets an expected valence premium compared to an independent candidate.
As before, a regular district is characterized by the median voter position y i , and the position of the two parties. The independent candidate has an expected position of y i . The median voter has expectations ( I ; D ; R ) about the valence of each of the three candidates and compares the utilities from the three candidates before deciding for whom to cast his ballot. As in Section 2, there exist party catchment areas, which correspond to the districts that vote for this party.
With endogenous valences, an equilibrium in district y i is a list of e¤ort provisions by candidates (e I ; e D ; e R ), a voting decision by the median voter and a list of consistent beliefs by all players. Beliefs are as follows. Given the e¤ort provision, the median voter has consistent expectations about the expected valence of the candidates. Given the voting decision of the median voter in district y i , the party candidates hold expectations about their party winning probability in district i and choose their e¤ort to maximize their expected utility. We thus have:
Lemma 1 An independent candidate never exerts any e¤ ort: e I = 0, and thus I = 0:
Proof. Since quality is not observable and since e¤ ort cannot directly a¤ ect the anticipations of the median voter, the independents' marginal return to e¤ ort is zero.
Lemma 2 For party candidates, equilibrium e¤ ort is proportional to the party's expected probability of winning the district. This probability of winning depends on the voters' expectation of equilibrium e¤ orts and on the parties' national platforms.
Proof. A candidate of party D who is selected wins with probability P D (y; ( I ; D ; R )). The about platform qualities. In that setup, we identify under which condition a given party prefers to organize internal primaries, given the internal structure of the other party, the preferences of the candidates, and the information available to voters. The expected valence corresponds to the probability that at least one party candidate has high quality. It is thus D = 1 (1 e D (y i )) 2 , where the second term is the probability that both candidates have low quality.
We thus …nd that, the stronger is the party in a district, the larger is the equilibrium level of e¤ort by its candidates. In all cases, the party candidate who wins the local primary ends up being reinforced as compared to a scenario in which there is no primary election: 13
Proposition 3
The catchment areas C P (x D ; x R ) of the two parties increase when valence is endogenous, in the sense that independent candidates win in fewer districts.
Proof. We want to compute the district that is indi¤erent between party D and the independent.
When party candidates expect to be elected for sure, their e¤ort is e
The marginal district is then de…ned by the following equality:
When party candidates expect to lose the election for sure, they make no e¤ort, the expected valence is thus zero and the party catchment area is the same as in the case of exogenous valence. The marginal district is then y = x D :
Direct Primaries and the threat of independents
Proposition 2, in the previous section, focused on the case a 2 . When a increases above that threshold, the threat of independents is real: the two parties necessarily lose some extreme districts to independents. Proposition 3 shows that introducing competition through primary elections is then a way to recover some of the ground gained by independents. Political parties thus give their candidates two advantages. The …rst one is the brand e¤ ect highlighted in the previous section. The second one is the trust e¤ ect highlighted here.
Being part of a party is a way for a candidate to commit himself to work harder at crafting good platforms. Ill-informed voters therefore "trust"more the platform of party candidates:
they expect him to have higher valence. As we showed, this valence advantage is a direct result of the additional tournament faced by party candidates: they must …rst win primary elections before being able to run in the general election. Proposition 3 shows that, when the brand e¤ect is not su¢ cient, parties can bene…t from organizing internal primaries:
these are a way to …ght against the threat of independent candidates in extreme districts.
It is therefore rational for political parties to introduce intraparty competition in the form of primary elections when the political environment becomes more uncertain and districts become more heterogeneous. 14 
Application: the American Direct Primary
Direct primary elections were introduced at the beginning of the 20th century and changed the structure of the US political system in many ways. In 1899, Minnesota was the …rst state to introduce a legislation mandating the use of direct primaries; by 1915, all states but three had enacted similar legislations. Before, parties could nominate their candidates through a system involving caucuses and conventions. The main characteristic of this system was that decision powers were in the hands of party delegates, and that there was little intraparty competition. The adoption of the direct primary increased this competition dramatically.
This switch to a competitive, candidate-centered system whose rules are largely outside the span of control of parties is still a puzzle to most political scientists. The classical expla-nation, put forward by Merriam and Overacker (1928) , is that the caucus-convention system was not working anymore and that, under pressure from the public and from outsiders, parties were forced to accept a reform that reduced their power. Ware (2002) casts doubts on this interpretation and argues that the parties were not actually forced into this reform.
They willingly adopted the direct primary in response to a change in the environment; they took advantage of these pressures to reinforce their domination on the political scene. Ware centers his analysis on his observation of the incentives that politicians, party leaders, and party elites were facing at the time of this reform. In particular, he argues that the threat of independent candidates was one of the reason behind the adoption of the direct primary.
Our model thus also provides a sound theoretical rationale for that reform: Proposition 3 indeed shows that parties bene…t most from introducing primaries precisely when the threat posed by independents is more serious.
Conclusion
In this paper, we put forward a model that emphasizes how the internal organization of parties allows voters to gather information about the future policy choices and the quality of politicians. We have shown that accounting for intraparty politics and allowing for the presence of independents in an otherwise standard model of electoral competition provides a formal rationale behind the dance between inequality and polarization that McCarty et al. In this paper, we kept voluntarily the model to its bare bones. We now discuss how generalizing several of its aspects impacts on our results and opens avenues for further …ndings.
Starting with the relationship between candidate selection and the median voters' decision, how do our results generalize to a setting in which parties cannot force politicians to follow the party line but, rather, the candidate selection rule can only screen out candidates whose preferences are not su¢ ciently close to the party line, as in the framework of Snyder and Ting (2002) ? This is the case studied by Castanheira and Crutzen (2008) , who
show that di¤erent districts value the capacity of parties to constraint the choices of their politicians di¤erently: districts close to the party line want as much discipline as possible, whereas distant districts want as little discipline as possible. This implies that the optimal level of intraparty discipline is always either of two extremes: 15 full discipline (in which case all selected politicians have the party line as their bliss point) or the minimum level of discipline allowed by the political system in which parties are embedded.
On top of being able to rationalize the American dance between polarization and inequality, they also show how this result o¤ers novel rationales behind the observed di¤erences in term of both intraparty discipline and the equilibrium number of parties in representative democracies. When institutions limit the freedom of party members (such as Parliamentary systems with a vote of con…dence procedure for the executive), parties will not free ride on these institutions. Rather, they will push intraparty discipline to its maximum. Conversely, absent institutional constraints on party discipline, as in the US presidential system, parties will choose as little intraparty discipline as possible. These …ndings complement the results of Huber (1996) and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) and further re…ne our understanding of the forces underlying the functioning of di¤erent political regimes in democracies such as the U.K., India, Canada and the US. Turning to the role of primaries in the selection of candidates, we assumed in this paper that their role is a pure signalling one, given that voters never observe the politicians' realized valence levels. This is a special case of the analysis in Castanheira, Crutzen and Sahuguet (2008). That paper presents a two-party general equilibrium model of electoral competition in terms of party structures that extends previous work by Caillaud and Tirole 1 5 This is the level that maximizes the party's catchment area. Where do we go from here? There are many interesting questions that have not received much attention so far but that could be analyzed within a framework similar to the one we proposed here. For example, how will changes in the legislation on campaign …nance a¤ect the political forces highlighted in this paper? Will a move to more candidate-centered politics, as seems to be happening in the US, strengthen or weaken parties? Will such a move lead to less party discipline, to the appearance of new parties, to more polarization? Should we hope the profession will address in the near future.
